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I. INTRODUCTION
As a country in the midst of a watershed moment, Iraq has the opportunity
to reexamine its criminal justice system. One of the major problems under
Saddam Hussein's regime was the use of criminal sentencing as a political tool
to remove those that threatened the regime.1 Therefore, in the context of the
transition from Saddam's regime to "a federal, democratic, pluralist, and
unified Iraq, in which there is full respect for political and human rights,"2 the
government, reexamining the intersection of democracy3 and the criminal
* J.D., University of Georgia School of Law, 2005; M.A., University ofWisconsin-Madison,
1999; A.B., University of Georgia, 1997.
See Human Rights Watch, Iraq: The Death Penalty, Executions, and "Prison Cleansing
A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, Mar. 2003, at http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/
iraq031103.htm (Mar. 2003); see, e.g., Bernard K. Freamon, Martyrdom, Suicide, and the
Islamic Law of War: A Short LegalHistory, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 299,346 (2003) (describing
how the "Revolutionary Command Council of the Saddam Hussein government," fearing
competition from Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and the Da'wah party he led, passed a law on March
31, 1980, "sentencing all Da'wah party members and their supporters to death") (citing T.M.
Aziz, The Role of Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr in Shi 'i Political Activism in Iraq from 1958 to
1980, 25 INT'L J. OF MIDDLE E. STUD. 207, 217 (1993)); Jackie Spinner, Iraq's New Form Of
Justice Seems To Satisfy Few, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2004, at Al 2 (describing the experience of
Luqman Thabit, judge in the Iraqi Central Criminal Court and former
"chief judge for Hussein's special secret court, in which sentences were often
dictated by the Iraqi leader or his sons. Thabit said he was fired and persecuted
by Hussein three years ago after he refused to sentence five prostitutes to death.
As a matter of law, the women did not deserve death, Thabit said .... Hussein's
son Uday had the women executed.").
2 S.C. Res. 1546, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4987th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (2004).
3 "Democracy" in the sense of "government by the people; that form of government in
which the sovereign power resides in the people as a whole, and is exercised either directly by
them (as in the small republics of antiquity) or by officers elected by them" not the modem usage
"more vaguely denoting a social state in which all have equal rights, without hereditary or
arbitrary differences of rank or privilege." OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 442-43 (2d ed. 1989)
[hereinafter OED] (s.v. "democracy"). See also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.
Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, art. 21, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR]
(declaring that
[elveryone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly
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justice system,4 must address sentencing reform.5 This reexamination is
crucial for the new Iraqi government because the fact that "[cirime poses a
serious threat to democratic institutions, both by undermining trust in
government and by encouraging excessive criminal justice punishment,"
inextricably links democracy and criminal justice.' Any new government in
Iraq must earn its citizens' trust after years of dictatorial abuse of that trust.'
The problem is especially acute because the new Iraqi government is closely
associated with the U.S.-led coalition. Therefore, it will face mistrust
stemming from Western influence, new government, and the abuses of the
former government. While this reexamination may lead to calls for public
participation as a general reaction to totalitarianism, the Iraqi government
should take the lessons learned from sentencing debates in the United States
and insulate sentencing from democratic processes in order to assure justice.
Without such insulation we may get an answer to the rhetorical question posed
in Gary LaFree's 2002 review of Punishment and Democracy: Three Strikes
and You're Out in California would "offering the citizens of... Iraq ... more
democratic input into sentencing decisions ... necessarily result in harsher
criminal justice penalties[?]"'
By contrast, the entrenched government in the United States limits
reassessment such that sentencing procedures remained relatively static until
a recent decision where the U.S. Supreme Court held that prosecutors must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt to ajury all facts used to calculate sentences
under the Washington state sentencing guidelines. 9 In her dissent, Justice
or through freely chosen representatives .... The will of the people shall be
the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in
periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage
and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.).
"Criminal justice system" in the sense of "the process through which the substantive
criminal law is enforced." YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1 (10th ed.
2002). The analysis presented here focuses on the very narrow scope of criminal sentencing
procedure. It does not address substantive criminal law, which is much more culturally specific
such that a purely legal comparison to culturally divergent models would be less fruitful.
' See Ayad Allawi, Editorial, A New Beginning, WASH. POST, June 27, 2004, at B7.
6 Gary LaFree, Book Review, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 875, 876 (2002) (reviewing
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL., Punishment and Democracy: Three Strikes and You 're Out in
California (2001)).
7 See Human Rights Watch, supra note 1; see, e.g., Freamon, supra note 1; Spinner, supra
note 1.
LaFree, supra note 6, at 886.
Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004); see Blakelyv. Washington andthe Future
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th
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O'Connor described "the practical consequences" of the decision as "disas-
trous," illustrating the power of the drive to maintain the status quo in
sentencing procedures.I" The practical consequences of implementing even the
existing sentencing procedures in Iraq are significant, so the difference
between implementing the pre-:existing procedure or a revised procedure is less
drastic there than it is in countries with entrenched judiciaries.
The balance between democracy and justice is a hard one to strike, whether
in a newly forming democracy as in Iraq or after over 200 years of constitu-
tional democracy as in the United States. Since the mid-1970s, criminal
sentencing in the United States has become less insulated from popular opinion
through legislative implementation of determinate sentencing," mandatory
minimum sentences, 2 repeat offender statutes, 3 and truth in sentencing laws. 4
At the extreme end of the spectrum where democracy directly determined
sentencing, a citizen-initiated referendum in California overwhelmingly
supported the implementation of a broad three strikes law. 5 Reflection on the
current state of that balance in the United States is necessary not only for U.S.
sentencing reform but also as a model, either positive or negative, for the
establishment of democracy and the reformation of criminal justice in post-
Saddam Iraq.
No model can account for the unique socio-political context of Iraq. Prime
Minister Ayad Allawi stated:
It should be noted that with all these initiatives, Iraq, like all
nations, has a unique cultural and historical national context, with
its own customs and values. The democratic system developed
Cong. (2004) (statement of Commissioner John R. Steer and Judge William K. Sessions, III,
Vice Chairs, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n), http://www.ussc.gov/hearings/BlakelyTest.pdf.
'o Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2544.
" Under determinate sentencing, judges sentence those convicted to "a set term, with the
defendant required to serve a high percentage of that term, less credits for good behavior."
KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 4, at 28.
12 Mandatory minimum sentences arise where legislatures pass statutes requiring judges to
impose minimum penalties for particular offenses. See id. at 1498-99.
13 A repeat offender statute (also known as a "two- or three-strikes-and-you're-out" law)
"orders long sentences foroffenders who receive [multiple] felony conviction[s]." Susan Turner
et al., The Impact of Truth-in-Sentencing and Three Strikes Legislation, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REv. 75, 75 (1999).
" A truth in sentencing law "requires that offenders serve a substantial proportion of their
imposed prison sentence." Id.
'5 LaFree, supra note 6, at 877 (referring to California's 1994 Initiative Number 184).
2004]
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in Iraq will not and should not be a replica of models imported
from theUnited States, Britain or any other country. Rather, we
Iraqis need to find and create the democratic political process that
works best for us, while sharing in the universal values of all free
nations, benefiting from the experience of other countries and
drawing on the advice of international organizations such as the
United Nations.16
However, comparative analysis of legal systems can be a starting point for
further inquiry by experts in the specificities of contemporary Iraq. 7 The
analysis undertaken here also leaves open the questions that arise when
applying models from adversarial criminal justice systems to an inquisitorial
criminal justice system.'I
This Note begins with an overview of the relationship between democratic
processes and sentencing systems. Part III describes, compares, and contrasts
four ways sentencing policy may be set in a democracy: (A) direct democracy,
(B) representative democracy, (C) delegated authority, and (D) insulated
delegation. 9 The section includes analyses of California's "Three Strikes and
You're Out" initiative, Georgia's patchwork sentencing legislation, the United
States' Sentencing Guidelines, and Minnesota's Sentencing Commission.
Each analysis poses four questions:
1. How much democratic control does this method exert over
general sentencing provisions and particular sentencing
applications?
2. Would the level of democratic control applied lead to exces-
sive punishment?
2°
16 Allawi, supra note 5.
17 Seegenerally John D. Jackson,Playing the Culture Cardin Resisting Cross-Jurisdictional
Transplants: A Comment on "Legal Processes and National Culture", 5 CARDOZO J. INT'L &
COMp. L. 51 (1997).
S Cf. William T. Pizzi & Luca Marafioti, The New Italian Code of CriminalProcedure: The
Dijficulties of Building an Adversarial Trial System on a Civil Law Foundation, 17 YALE J.
INT'LL. 1 (1992) (describing the institutional resistance to the new Code of Criminal Procedure
adopted by the Republic ofltalyin 1989 that incorporated significant adversarial procedures into
what had previously been a purely inquisitorial system).
'9 See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL., PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND
YOU'RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 181-85 (2001).
20 "Excessive punishment" may be defined as a punishment disproportionate to a crime.
Different groups draw their own boundaries to describe proportionate sentences. One relatively
[Vol. 33:303
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3. Does the level of democratic control applied protect defen-
dants from the arbitrary2 application of punishment?
4. Is this approach to, establishing sentencing policy feasible?
These analyses lead to the conclusion that Iraq's new government should
institute an insulated delegation model to create sentencing policy with ample
allowance for judicial discretion. Such a model prevents excessive punish-
ment, protects against arbitrary punishment, and is a feasible approach to
establishing sentencing policy.
II. BACKGROUND
To what extent does the democratic process impact criminal sentencing?
Professor Philip Pettit described the relationship between the democratic
process and criminal sentencing as an "outrage dynamic"22 that "will operate
in any society where the media can give exposure to crime, where this
exposure will give rise to outrage, and where the public authorities are forced
to respond to that outrage, in particular to respond in a manner that reflects the
feelings in the community. 23 He goes on to argue that the media and public
outrage cannot be curbed in a democratic society.24 However, Pettit offers the
clear line of demarcation is the death penalty. Various international human rights agreements
set boundaries based on international norms regarding proportionality in imposing the death
penalty. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 19, 1966, art 6, para. 2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 174 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976)
(declaring that "[i]n countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may
be imposed only for the most serious crimes"). However, what constitutes a disproportionate
sentence short of the death penalty remains a gray area. Compare id. art. 8, para. 3 (allowing "in
countries where imprisonment with hard labour may be imposed as a punishment for a crime,
the performance of hard labour in pursuance of a sentence to such punishment by a competent
court"), with UDHR, supra note 3, art. 5 (declaring that "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture
or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment"). This Note does not attempt to
define the parameters of proportionate sentencing in Iraq; it merely evaluates methods of
determining sentencing policy in terms of the relationship between crimes and punishments.
21 "Arbitrary" defined as "founded on prejudice or preference rather than on reason or fact."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 100 (8th ed. 2004). See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law
of Rules, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 1175, 1178 (1989) (naming "the appearance of equal treatment" as
"one of the most substantial.., values" of judicial decisions).
2 Philip Pettit, Democracy and Punishment: Is Criminal Justice Politically Feasible?, 5
BUFF. CGil. L. REv. 427,428-30 (2002).
23 Id. at 441.
24 Id.
2004]
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possibility "of' removing from the public authorities the onus of having to
respond in kind to feelings of outrage on the part of their constituents." 25 In
Iraq, the new government must create a system that will insulate criminal
sentencing from temporary popular demands.
The new government must balance the necessity of responding to public
concern over the current post-war lawlessness26 with the necessity of
reestablishing a criminal justice system that has been undermined by dictatorial
control.2 7 At first glance, especially after years without a democratic system,
the best solution seems to be a direct democratic process of setting sentencing
policy. However, the failure of such a process in California suggests
otherwise. The fifty-one U.S. criminal justice systems offer examples along
a spectrum of democratic determination of sentencing policy, from the
electorate determining sentencing policy by popular vote to elected representa-
tives appointing insulated officials who determine sentencing policy. Iraq's
new democratic government should institute a relatively undemocratic system
to set sentencing policy based on an insulated delegation model in order to
avoid the problems of excessive punishment, arbitrary application, and
infeasibility found in models that are more directly democratic.
A. The Evolution of Democracy's Interaction with Criminal Sentencing
The modem story of sentencing in the United States is one of increasing
distrust of government officials as manifested by a movement to constrict
judicial discretion.28 Until the mid-1970s, the standard sentencing procedure
in both federal and state courts was an indeterminate sentencing process
whereby the judge would sentence an offender to a range of years and the
parole board would determine when, within that range, the offender would be
released based on whether or not that individual had been "rehabilitated., 29 In
25 Id.
26 See Greg Jaffe & Alexei Barrionuevo, U.S. Estimates 5, 000 Iraqi Resisters, WALL ST. J.,
July28, 2003, at A5, 2003 WL-WSJ 3975250; Farnaz Fassihi, Iraqi Shiites Are Split on Political
Role, WALL ST. J., Sept. 2, 2003, at A13, 2003 WL-WSJ 3978440.
27 See Human Rights Watch, supra note 1; see, e.g., Freamon, supra note 1, at 343-47;
Spinner, supra note 1.
28 For a summary of the history of sentencing in the United States in the context of
separation of powers that involves many of the same concerns addressed here see Jessica S.
Intermill & William E. Martin, Separation of Powers Doctrine and the Feeney Amendment: The
Constitutional Case for Judicial Discretion in Sentencing, 27 HAMuNE L. REV. 391, 402-16
(2004).
29 See SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROLOF DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL
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the mid-1970s, both liberals and conservatives began vocally opposing
indeterminate sentencing.3" Liberal opposition, responding to the civil rights
movement, saw the judiciary as a remaining bastion of racial discrimination.3
Conservative opposition, responding to a decade of increasing crime, deemed
the rehabilitative principles behind indeterminate sentencing ineffective.
32
Both liberals and conservatives argued that the problem was that the indetermi-
nate sentencing process allowed judges and parole boards unfettered
discretion.33 Both had the goal of consistent sentences for consistent crimes.34
In response, many state legislatures and the U.S. Congress instituted
sentencing commissions empowered to set either mandatory or advisory
sentencing guidelines. "Sentencing commissions differ in many particular
respects. The membership of the commission, the amount of legislative
control, [and] the nature of their authority to draft guidelines without
legislative action are some of the major ways in which these sentencing
commissions differ."3  Many state legislatures instituted determinate
sentencing and passed a patchwork of mandatory minimum sentencing, three-
strikes-and-you're-out, and truth in sentencing laws.36 Whether through
sentencing commissions or patchwork legislation, thejudiciary lost significant
independence throughout the United States.
The independence of Iraq's judiciary began to shrink earlier than that of
their U.S. colleagues. British occupation and administration began during
World War I and ended when Iraq became an independent kingdom in 1932. 37
JUSTICE, 1950-1990, at 3-21 (1993).
30 See ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 19, at 212.
31 See KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 4, at 1498.
32 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5
(1986).
33 See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Your Cheatin 'Heart(land): The Long Search for
Administrative Sentencing Justice, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 723, 724-25 (1999).
14 See R. Barry Ruback & Jonathan Wroblewski, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
Psychological andPolicy Reasonsfor Simplification, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 739,744-45
(2001).
3' Blake Nelson, Note, The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines: The Effects of Determinate
Sentencing on Disparities in Sentencing Decisions, 10 LAW & INEQ. 217, 222 n.21 (1992).
36 See Kay A. Knapp, Allocation of Discretion and Accountability Within Sentencing
Structures, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 679, 685 (1993) (describing how the term "truth in sentencing"
is used to describe four different ideas: (1) "judicial control of sentencing as opposed to back-
end control" by parole boards, (2) "close correspondence between the pronounced sentence and
time served," (3) "adherence to articulated standards," and (4) "predictability of time served").
" U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, Iraq, in THE WORLD FACTBOOK, http://www.cia.gov/
cia/publications/factbook/geos/izhtml (last updated Oct. 19, 2004).
2004]
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"A 'republic' was proclaimed in 1958, but in actuality a series of military
strongmen have ruled [Iraq] since then. 38 Even before the rise of the Ba'ath
regime that began with the coup on July 17, 1968, the government of Iraq was
not democratic and opposed "judicial scrutiny of [its] political actions." 39
However, before the coup, the Iraqi judiciary "enjoyed a certain degree of
independence in fulfilling its duties and making its rulings, which were
characterized by the principle of even-handedness, solid substantiation and
profound legal reasoning," and resulted in case law that had value as
precedent." The government's concern with upholding "the sphere of social
order and individual rights" led to judicial independence, albeit limited, and
"ensured a modest level of justice" in that sphere.4
After the coup, the Ba'ath party subsumed the legislative, executive, and
judicial branches of government under the ultimate power of Saddam
Hussein.42 The Ba'ath regime "eliminate[d] any remaining role for an
independent judiciary" by "dissolv[ing] the Judicial Council" and replacing it
with" 'the justice council' headed by the minister of justice who reported to
the President. As a consequence, the Iraqi judge [became] a mere functionary
following orders from the political power."43 Hence, under Saddam Hussein
the judiciary lost any semblance of independence.
The Coalition Provisional Authority clearly asserted control of the criminal
justice system of Iraq. On June 18, 2003, L. Paul Bremer III, Administrator of
the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, issued Coalition Provisional
Authority Order Number 13 creating the Central Criminal Court of Iraq" and
38 Id.
39 Working Group on Transitional Justice in Iraq & Iraqi Jurists' Association, Transitional
Justice in Post-Saddam Iraq: The Road to Re-establishing Rule of Law and Restoring Civil
Society 20 (Mar. 2003) [hereinafterRoad], at https://www.jagcnet.arny.mil/JAGCNETIntemet/
Homepages/AC/CLAMO-Public.nsf (Select "Iraqi Freedom").
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
41 Id. at21.
" The Central Criminal Court of Iraq, Ord. No. 13, Coalition Provisional Authority,
CPA/ORD/18 June 2003/13 (2003). See generally Working Group on "Transitional Justice in
Iraq" Meets in Washington (July 12, 2002) (describing how the U.S. Department of State
convened the Working Group on Transitional Justice in Iraq, "a group of Iraqi jurists[,] ... Iraqi-
Americans and international experts.... to discuss how to promote the rule of law in Iraq, and
how to initiate judicial reform"), http://www.usembassy.it/file2002_07/alia/a2071506.htm; Iraqi
Jurists' Association, Inaugural Announcement (describing The Iraqi Jurists' Association as a
London-based, non-partisan group ofIraqi jurists, primarily living abroad, that opposed Saddam
Hussein's regime and are currently working to reestablish the rule of law in Iraq), http://www.
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Coalition Provisional Authority Memorandum Number 3 modifying the Iraqi
Law on Criminal Proceedings of 197 L"
B. Current Concerns in the United States and Iraq Regarding the Effects of
Democracy on Criminal Sentencing
Data on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines can give some indication of the
concerns regarding similar reductions in judicial independence across the
United States. At the federal level, research has shown that the United States
Sentencing Guidelines have limited judicial independence to such an extent
that
[a]t least one federal district court judge has since resigned in
protest over the Guidelines, while something akin to a mutiny
occurred in one federal court when forty-three district court
judges in the Second Circuit took the remarkable step of publicly
denouncing the Guidelines' constriction of judicial discretion.
Many other district judges, convinced that "there is something
profoundly wrong with this guidelines system," refrain from
public comment or suffer stoically.46
Arguing against expansion of legislative control, Scott C. Idleman, quoted "the
somewhat tart words of Jos6 Cabranes, a widely respected federal circuit
ija2.co.uk/html/fe.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2004).
45 Criminal Procedures, Mem. No. 3, Coalition Provisional Authority, CPA/Mem/18 Jun
2003/3 (2003). See generally IRAQ LAW ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURES of 1971 (English
translation), https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/JAGCNETIntemet/Homepages/AC/CLAMO-Public.
nsf (last updated May 28, 2004).
46 Jack H. McCall, Jr., The Emperor's New Clothes: Due Process Considerations Under the
FederalSentencing Guidelines, 60 TENN. L. REv. 467,471 (1993) (citing Criticizing Sentencing
Rules, U.S. Judge Resigns, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1990, at A22; Steve Y. Koh, Note,
Reestablishing the Federal Judge's Role in Sentencing, 101 YALE L.J. 1109, 1109 (1992);
United States v. Dibiase, 687 F. Supp. 38, 41 n.18 (D. Conn. 1988); Supposedly "Scientific
Sentencing" Is a "Dismal Failure", CONN. L. TRM., Jan. 20, 1992, at 14; Stuart Taylor, Jr.,
Federal Judges Bound and Gagged by Mandatory Criminal Sentencing, RECORDER, Jan. 23,
1992, at 6; Committee on Federal Courts, New York Bar Ass'n, Transforming the Sentencing
"Guidelines" into (Just) Guidelines: Comments on the Federal Govt's Study Committee
Proposal, RECORD 675, 676-77 (1992); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
PROCEEDINGS OF TuE FORTY-EIGHTH JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIRCUIT 150 (West 1987), cited in United States v. Harrington, 947 F.2d 956, 967 n.12 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) (Edwards, J., concurring)).
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judge, [who stated] 'the Sentencing Guidelines system is a failure-a dismal
failure, a fact well known and fully understood by virtually everyone who is
associated with the federal justice system.' "' These anecdotes proved to be
representative of a larger trend in a number of empirical studies collected by
Professor Doris Marie Provine, who wrote:
In a 1992 survey by the Federal Judicial Center, only 16% of the
districtjudges surveyed described themselves as supporters of the
guidelines, and 79% declared themselves ready to repeal most or
all mandatory minimum sentences. A 1996 center survey
indicated that time had not softened these negative attitudes: 73%
of district judges and 69% of appellate judges surveyed stated
that mandatory guidelines are unnecessary . . . . Mandatory
minimums leave even less room for judicial discretion, which
helps explain why all of the federal circuits have gone on record
to oppose them.4"
Judges are not merely protecting their turf. Commentators widely condemn the
reduction of judicial discretion. For example, Charles J. Ogletree, Jr.,
criticized the Sentencing Guidelines for failing to "[a]ddress the [u]nderlying
[p]urposes of the [c]riminal [s]anction," "[a]llow [a]dequate [c]onsideration
of [o]ffender [c]haracteristics," and "[a]ccount for [pirison [o]vercrowding." '49
Ogletree attributed federal prison overcrowding to the compound effect of the
sentencing guidelines and existing federal sentencing statutes "reduc[ing] the
availability ofprobationary sentences and increas[ing] the average time served
for violent offenses."5 Ogletree specifically called for more judicial discretion
by arguing that "the Commission should have realized that it is a person who
stands before the bar to accept the punishment imposed by the court."5! This
" Scott C. Idleman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Pushing the Limits of
Legislative Power, 73 TEX. L. REV. 247, 261 (citing Jos6 A. Cabranes, Sentencing Guidelines:
A Dismal Failure, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 11, 1992, at 2).
48 Doris Marie Provine, Too Many Black Men: The Sentencing Judge's Dilemma, 23 LAW
& SOC. INQUIRY 823, 841 (1998) (citations omitted).
41 Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1938, 1952-54 (1988).
'o Id. at 1955. See, e.g., Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 218(a), 98 Stat. 1837,
2027 (repealing 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a), which had allowed parole for federal sentences, and 18
U.S.C. §§ 4161-4166, which had allowed statutory good time reductions of time served).
"' Ogletree, supra note 49, at 1953.
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call for individualized review parallels the demand made by the Working
Group on Transitional Justice in Iraq and Iraqi Jurists' Association that,
"[s]entencing decisions should be made specific to the individual defendant. ' 2
The Iraqi legal community has expressed goals for post-conflict criminal
justice reform. A major facet of the Working Group on Transitional Justice in
Iraq and Iraqi Jurists' Association's March 2003 The Road to Re-establishing
Rule of Law and Restoring Civil Society stated that
[i]n both its legislation and its actions the Iraqi regime has
violated (and continues to violate) every aspect of humanitarian
law as set forth in international covenants and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. This includes imposing or
increasing sentences with the death penalty without regard to the
well-established legal principles that:
- There is no crime and therefore no punishment without a
specific text in the penal code.
- Criminal laws cannot be retroactively applied.
- The accused is innocent until proven guilty.
- Sentencing decisions should be made specific to the individ-
ual defendant.
- There should be no more than one punishment for the same
crime."
Both Iraq and the United States are at crisis points regarding their respective
judiciaries' independence.54 Iraq has no acceptable historical models.55 The
United States has fifty-one different models, but determining which model
most successfully balances the need for democratic input and the need for an
independent judiciary requires comparative analysis.
52 Road, supra note 39, at 16.
5 Road, supra note 39, at 16.
"See generally David M. Zlotnick, The War Within the War on Crime: The Congressional
Assault on Judicial Sentencing Discretion, 57 SMU L. REV. 211 (2004) (discussing changes in
recent law further restricting federal judicial sentencing discretion).
" See Road, supra note 39, at 26 (stating "that any attempt to enforce any of Iraq's past
constitutions since 1925 will antagonize one group or another in Iraq and provoke senseless
disputes").
2004]
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III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
The following analysis adopts the analytical model put forth by Franklin E.
Zimring and his coauthors in Punishment and Democracy. Their framework
fits well because, in developing this analytical model of punishment and
democracy for application in the United States, the problem Zimring and his
coauthors pose is equally pertinent in a post-Saddam Iraq: "Where [should] the
power to punish ... be located in democratic systems of government"?56
Zimring and his coauthors define democracy as "a system of governance in
which those who exercise government power are subject to the electoral
control of citizens by majority vote."57 In most modem democracies, each
criminal sentence is determined by two levels of decision-making.58 First,
general provisions including which actions result in which consequences "and
which types of offenders will be eligible for which types ofpunishment... are
. ..usually promulgated by legislative bodies," but can also come from
sentencing commissions and "in some recent cases, voters."59  Second,
sentencing judges and parole authorities determine "particular application of
these rules to a convicted offender determin[ing] which kinds and amount of
punishment will be imposed in the case of a particular person."6 The power
of determining sentences is thus distributed among branches of government:
the legislative branch primarily determines general provisions, the judicial
branch is responsible for particular applications, and the executive branch
influences sentences through parole authorities and correctional officials where
time off for good behavior applies.61 This separation of powers model is
conducive to the Working Group's goal of reinstituting three independent
5 ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 19, at 182-83.
I ld. at 183; cf Coalition Provisional Authority, Basic Elements of Democracy, http://www.
cpa-iraq.org/democracy/basic-elements.html (last visited Oct. 23,2004) (defining the elements
of democracy as "[p]opular sovereignty," including "[a] people... 'social contract' agreement
among elements... form a single self-governing country," "[s]elf-goveming country," and
"[c]itizens/citizenship"; "[e]lections and voting-free, periodic" including
"[m]ajority/supermajority rule" and "[m]inority rights"; and "[r]epresentation" including
"[lI]egislatures," "[florms of representation," and "[e]quality"). But see LaFree, supra note 6,
at 887 (taking issue with Zimring's definition of democracy because it "limits the discussion
mostly to differences in how closely punishment is tied to majority voting and pays little
attention to other potentially important characteristics of democracy in America").
58 ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 19, at 182.
" Id. (referring to California's 1994 Initiative Number 184).
6 Id.
6 Id. at 182-84.
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branches of government in Iraq.62 In the United States, "democratically elected
legislatures usually select general provisions of penal legislation but leave to
judges and expert administrative bodies the details of policy and the particular
decisions in individual cases. This division of authority is utterly typical of
modern government and is in no sense peculiar to criminal punishment."63
Zimring and his coauthors delineate four levels of interaction between
democracy and criminal punishment: (A) direct democracy, (B) representative
democracy, (C) delegated authority, and (D) insulated delegation.' This Note
will examine these four levels of connection between democracy and
punishment to evaluate each as it might work in Iraq. Sentencing procedures
in California, Georgia, the U.S. federal system, and Minnesota illustrate these
levels of interaction.
A. Direct Democracy
Under a direct democracy model, "the punishments available and imposed
in particular cases are selected by the majority vote of participating citizens."6'
Direct democracy is the most democratic system of determining sentences.66
Though examples of particular application by an entire community's
majority vote are theoretical67 or extragovernmental, 68 Zimring provides two
examples of systems that "move pretty close to some form of direct democ-
racy. ',69 The first example is the use of juries in the penalty phase of criminal
trials thereby requiring "direct involvement of the citizenry in the particular
application of punishment."7 ° Juries commonly participate in the sentencing
phase of U.S. death penalty cases.7' Kansas requires "any fact that would
increase the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum, other than a
62 Road, supra note 39, at 26.
63 ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 19, at 184-85.
64 Id. at 183-84.
65 Id. at 183.
SId.
67 For example, imagine a referendum on how long Martha Stewart should serve in prison
for her conviction for "obstructing a government investigation into her sale oflmClone Systems
Inc. stock." Kara Scannell, Executives on Trial: Stewart and Ex-Broker Seek New Trial
Faulting Prosecutors, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2004, at C3, 2004 WL-WSJ 56931695.
68 See, e.g., Reuters, Peruvian Burned Alive for Stealing Gas Cannister, Oct. 7, 2004,
available at WL 10/7/04 RTRENGNS 21:56:48.
69 ZIMRJNG ET AL., supra note 19, at 183.
70 Id.
71 Id.
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prior conviction, [ ] be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt" in all felony cases.72 In the wake of United States v. Booker, juries may
become involved in the sentencing phase of all U.S. felony cases if legislatures
attempt to rescue sentencing guidelines.73 The second example, and primary
focus of Punishment and Democracy, is the passage of a general provision by
popular referendum "that requires a single punishment for the entire class of
cases covered by the general provisions."74  California presents the best
example of direct democracy because of the highly publicized rise of the
public initiative in that state.75 Under pressure from a public initiative,
California's legislature passed the citizen-drafted three strikes law-better
described as a repeat offender law as it includes penalties for two "strikes" or
more.76 California's three strikes law77 has been described as "a dangerous
example of growing populist influence over sentencing outcomes in
America."78 Beyond procedural direct democracy, the three strikes initiative
and the follow-up mandatory sentencing initiatives aim at substantive direct
democracy as well. Mandatory sentencing avoids discretionary power
"because government officials (particularly judges) are not to be trusted. In
this regard, one of the great attractions of the initiative process ... is that it
bypasses the process of representative democracy."79 Of the four methods to
determine sentencing policy compared here, citizen-drafted initiatives exert the
highest level of democratic control over general sentencing provisions because
initiatives bypass representative democracy.
Regarding the second point of comparison, it is unclear whether direct
democracy is the most likely of the four methods to lead to excessive
punishment if employed in post-Saddam Iraq. The California three strikes
initiative provides the best example of how direct democratic control of
sentencing policy leads to excessive punishment."0 When given the opportu-
72 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4716(b).
" United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 779 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74 Id.
71 Id. at 139; see, e.g., Jackie Calmes & John Harwood, In California Vote, Gov. Davis Is
Out, SchwarzeneggerIn, WALLST. J., Oct. 8, 2003, at Al, 2003 WL-WSJ 3982109 (describing
the power of the initiative in California to recall Governor Gray Davis).
76 ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 19, at 139.
77 CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 667 (West 2003).
78 LaFree, supra note 6, at 875.
9 ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 19, at 142.
80 See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77 (2003) (5-4 decision) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(arguing California's three strikes law violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment because it results in "sentence[s] grossly disproportionate to the offense[s]
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nity to amend their" 'Three Strikes' law to require increased sentences only
when [the offender's] current conviction is for [a] specified violent and/or
serious felony" 52.7% of California's voters chose to leave the existing
language of the statute intact.8' Individual, highly publicized incidents have
been shown to sway public opinion such that direct democratic responses
become referenda on what punishment the latest high-profile criminal deserves
rather than a rational implementation of broadly applicable policy.82 LaFree
reasons that the highly publicized Klaas kidnapping-sexual assault-murder by
a "twice-convicted violent offender who had recently been paroled from the
state prison system" led California citizens to ask for extremely harsh
punishments for recidivist offenders in Initiative Number 184 even though
California's three strikes law had been passed earlier that year. 3 Professor
Philip Pettit expressed concern that setting sentencing policy by political
reaction to public indignation creates a system "in danger of representing a
'tyranny of the avengers.' ... Even those who laud the rule of popular will
must admit that the [outrage] dynamic is subject to too much exploitation by
media or politicians to count as a channel for the undistorted expression of that
will.""M In post-Saddam Iraq, public outrage along a number of factional lines
85
could lead to radical sentencing policy if direct democracy was employed. 6
for which [they are] imposed"); see also Scalia, supra note 21, at 1180 (stating that one of a
judge's "most significant roles... [is] to protect the individual criminal defendant against the
occasional excesses of [the] popular will, and to preserve the checks and balances within our
system that are precisely designed to inhibit swift and complete accomplishment of that popular
will").
s' Cal. Sec'y of State, Official Voter Information Guide: Proposition 66, http://www.
voterguide.ss.ca.gov/propositions/prop66-title.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2005); Cal. Sec'y of
State, State Ballot Measures, http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/sov/2004_.general/formatted-ballot
_rmeasures-detail.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2005).
82 See Pettit, supra note 22, at 441.
' LaFree, supra note 6, at 877; see PHILP JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF
THE CHILD MOLESTER IN MODERN AMERICA 196-201 (1998) (recounting the killings of Megan
Kanka and Polly Klaas and the subsequent legislative responses).
84 Pettit, supra note 22, at 440 (citing CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU,
THE SPIRIT OFTHE LAWS 203 (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989)
(1748)).
85 Susan Sachs, The Sheik Takes Over; In Iraq"s Next Act, Tribes May Play the Lead Role,
N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2004, § 4, at 14.
86 See Howard LaFranchi, Why Direct Elections in Iraq CouldBackfire, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Feb. 10, 2004 (reporting that one "problem with elections in transitional countries is
that they can tend to favor the more radical elements in a society"), 2004 WL 58692805. While
LaFranchi implicates a religion-specific concept of radicalism, the plurality described by Sachs
could lead to structural radicalism in the sense that in a pluralistic direct democracy, the plurality
2004]
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Iraqis have two concerns in tension with one another: crime and mistrust
of government.8 7 According to the Iraqi Jurist Association, "[t]he absence of
legitimate legislative and judicial authorities, as they were turned into tools in
the service of tyranny, oppression, repression, depredation and murder, has
lead [sic], in turn, to a rapid and unprecedented rise in crime, corruption and
social and family disintegration in Iraq."88 LaFree states in his summary of
Zimring and his colleagues' argument, "harsh punishments may be more likely
to accompany periods of high mistrust in government because these are times
when crime likely appears to be a bigger problem and when judges are more
likely to be seen as overly lenient on offenders." 9 This theory does not apply
as neatly to Iraq, therefore it is less clear whether direct democracy would lead
to general provisions for excessive punishment,
Regarding the third point of comparison, direct democracy merely shifts the
possibility of arbitrary application rather than eliminating it. In California, the
three strikes law has merely removed power from judges and shifted it to
prosecutors. In general, as judicial discretion becomes narrower, sentencing
power shifts to prosecutors.91 For example, the prosecutor may choose not to
charge the accused with crimes that fall under. the three strikes law. The
capacity for arbitrary application shifts with discretion. 92 In Iraq, prosecutors
already wield significant power.93 Therefore, arbitrary application would
simply shift from the sentencing phase to the charging phase.
In addition to not preventing arbitrary application in individual instances,
a directly democratic method of reforming sentencing policy as a whole is not
feasible. In California, the number of signatures required to get an initiative
on the ballot is very high and the signature collection process costs a
would determine sentencing with which the majority may disagree. See id.; Sachs, supra note
85.
87 See Press Release, United States Department of Defense, Ambassador Bremer Statement
from Baghdad, Iraq (May 15,2003), http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030515-
0186.html.
8 Inaugural Announcement, supra note 44.
89 LaFree, supra note 6, at 883.
9' See Margaret Graham Tebo, Questions on Sentences: Changes to Guidelines Become a
Separation-of-Powers Dispute, A.B.A. J., July 1989, at 13, 13 (describing reaction to U.S.
legislation limiting judges' sentencing discretion).
9' LaFree, supra note 6, at 880-81.
92 KAMISAR ETAL., supra note 4, at 1498-99.
9' See generally IRAQLAW ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURES (1971) (English translation), https://
www.jagcnet.army.mil/JAGCNETlnternet/Homepages/AC/CLAMO-Public.nsf (last updated
May 28, 2003).
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significant amount of time and money.9 4 Furthermore, as the recent elections
in Iraq illustrated, violence and factional boycotts could severely undermine
the legitimacy of a directly democratic process.95 To pass multiple sentencing
policies by means of initiative or referendum would be both time and cost
prohibitive even if elections were legitimate. Therefore, the system-wide
reform Iraq should undergo would not be feasible under a direct democracy
model.
B. Representative Democracy
Under a representative democracy model, the citizenry elects representa-
tives to determine general provisions and/or particular applications.96 When
the citizenry elects "legislators who promulgate the general provisions of penal
law," that portion of sentence determination is decided through representative
democracy.97 When the legislature passes general provisions that "have
mandatory penalties, the particular applications have also been selected by
representative democracy, so in formal terms the selection of individual
penalties takes place only one step removed from majority vote."98
Another method of representative democracy that is becoming more
common in the United States is the election of judges.99 Though there is
significant separation of power between the legislative and judicial branches
in terms of an individual's sentencing determination, where both are subject
to representative democracy there is only one step "between public sentiment
9 Cal. Sec'y of State, 2004 Initiative Update (explaining that
California uses the direct initiative process, which enables voters to bypass
the Legislature and have an issue of concern put directly on the ballot for
voter approval or rejection. There are two types of initiatives that can be
placed on the ballot: 1) statute revision, which requires signatures equal to
five percent of the total votes cast for Governor in the preceding gubernatorial
election, and 2) constitutional amendment, which requires signatures equal
to eight percent of the Governor's total vote in the preceding gubernatorial
election),
http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/electionsj.htm (as of Sept. 27, 2004).
95 See John F. Bums, Iraqis Begin Tabulating Results of Milestone Election, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 1, 2005, at A8.
96 ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 19, at 183.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.; see id. at 186 (stating that, as of 2001, twenty-seven states required that trial judges
be elected and eleven states required "periodic election review for judges selected by state
executives").
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and penal choice."'" Legislators are subject to public approval at the polls for
their handling of general sentencing provisions. Wherejudges are also elected,
judges are subject to public approval at the polls for their application of
sentences. Representative democracy exerts less democratic control over
general sentencing provisions than direct democracy. Regarding particular
sentencing applications, representative democracy via election ofjudges exerts
slightly less democratic control than where juries make determinations in
sentencing phases. Regarding both general sentencing provisions and
particular sentencing applications, representative democracy exerts more
democratic control than either delegated authority or insulated delegation.
Representative democracy is a common method of determining general
sentencing provisions and is becoming more common in terms of particular
applications. Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan,
Russia, and (in some respects) the U.S. federal government determine general
provisions through representative democracy. "l Among the fifty states of the
United States, forty-two determine general provisions via representative
democracy." 2 Thirty-eight U.S. states determine particular applications via
representative democracy.10 3
Georgia's patchwork of sentencing legislation presents a classic example
of general sentencing provisions determined by representative democracy. The
two major pieces of sentencing legislation are the Repeat Offender statute and
the Seven Deadly Sins statute. The Repeat Offender statute, O.C.G.A. § 17-
10-7, requires judges to impose the maximum sentence prescribed by statute
for the current offense where the offender has previously been convicted of a
felony.' This statute does carve a small space for judicial discretion in that
00 Idat 184.
10' Id. at 185 (see Table 10.1) (describing the situation in G-7 nations before Russia joined
to make it the G-8 in 1998); Ilya V. Nikiforov, Russia, in WORLD FACTBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEMS, (describing Russia's criminal justice system where the popularly elected
legislature determines general sentencing provisions), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/
ascii/wfbcjrus.txt (last visited Oct. 23, 2004); see ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 19, at 186
(reporting that "[tihe United States at the federal level delegates most general policies to a
sentencing commission").
'02 ZIMRINGETAL.,supra note 19, at 186-87 (see Table 10.2).
103 Id.
04 Beyond general provisions for mandatory sentencing ranges, some individual criminal
statutes also have built-in enhanced sentences for recidivist offenders. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 16-
13-30 (prescribing one range of sentences for first offenders and a higher range of sentences for
recidivist offenders convicted of possession, manufacturing, etc., of certain controlled
substances); Partain v. State, 228 S.E.2d 292,294 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976), aff'd, 232 S.E.2d 46 (Ga.
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"unless otherwise provided by law, the trial judge may, in his or her discretion,
probate or suspend the maximum sentence prescribed for the offense."'0 5 The
Seven Deadly Sins statute, O.C.G.A. § 17-10-6.1, defines murder or felony
murder, armed robbery, kidnapping, rape, aggravated child molestation,
aggravated sodomy, and aggravated sexual battery as "serious violent
felon[ies]. ' '1°6 When sentencing offenders convicted of these offenses, the
statute requires judges to impose "a mandatory minimum term of imprison-
ment of ten years.' 1 7 Furthermore, this statute curtails important judicial
discretion regarding imprisonment versus probation by requiring that "no
portion of the mandatory minimum sentence imposed shall be suspended,
stayed, probated, deferred, or withheld by the sentencing court."'0 s The Seven
Deadly Sins statute also imposes requirements, resembling truth in sentencing,
on the amount of time served.0 9 Additionally, offenders under this statute are
exempt from first offender protections including consideration for early
release."l1
The proliferation of mandatory minimums, repeat offender statutes, and
truth in sentencing laws indicates that representative democracy has almost the
same likelihood of leading to excessive punishment as direct democracy.
However, the legislative compromise process tends to diffuse radical
changes.l"' If the multiethnic and multireligious background of Iraq gives rise
to multiparty democracy," 2 the political process will be more likely to diffuse
radical change by requiring coalitions to cooperate. On the other hand, it is
easy for politicians to run for election under the rubric of law and order by
championing ever harsher sentencing legislation." 3 Likewise, politicians find
1977) (illustrating that because Georgia does not require a minimum amount to support a
conviction for drug possession, successive convictions for relatively minor drug possession
offenses force judges to sentence petty drug addicts at the higher range under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-
30).
105 O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(a).
106 O.C.G.A. § 17-10-6.1(a).
107 O.C.G.A. § 17-10-6.1(b).
108 id.
109 O.C.G.A. § 17-10-6.1(b)-(c).
110 Id.
1" ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 19, at 193.
112 See, e.g., U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, Lebanon, in THE WORLD FACTBOOK
(describing how representatives in Lebanon's National Assembly are "elected by popular vote
on the basis of sectarian proportional representation"), http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/
factbook/geos/le.html (last updated Oct. 19, 2004).
13 See Judge K.L. McIff, Views from the Bench: Getting Smart as Well as Tough on Crime,
UTAH B.J., Nov. 1998, at41, 41.
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it difficult to oppose increased sentences because they must then face their
constituency's accusations of being soft on crime. With this lack of support
for reasonable sentencing, representative democracy is more likely to lead to
excessive punishment than either delegated authority or insulated democracy.
Representative democracy offers no guarantee that arbitrary sentencing will
be adequately reduced. As under direct democracy, the power to determine
sentences shifts to prosecutors because they retain power to determine the
charges against a defendant. Consequently, the power to arbitrarily apply
sentences shifts to prosecutors. Additionally, a patchwork legislative system
omits some crimes that may thereby be subject to arbitrary application by
judges. Furthermore, judges subject to reelection may take the same tack as
law and order legislators and arbitrarily impose a sentence based on public
opinion.4 . Therefore, whether representative democracy would reduce
arbitrary application is unclear. Since arbitrary application was the .primary
tool of political oppression under Saddam Hussein, representative democracy
does not resolve this problem sufficiently for.use in Iraq.
Despite the apparent feasibility of representative democracy, its shortcom-
ings render it an inappropriate solution in Iraq. In terms of feasibility,
representative democracy costs less than voter initiatives in that if there is a
legislature in place it can address general sentencing reform. In addition, the
duration of the term of office coupled with staggered elections somewhat
insulate legislators and judges such that they may develop expertise that makes
the process under their control more efficient. Election of judges is clearly
more efficient than referenda on every sentence for every criminal convicted.
However, these advantages are outweighed by patchwork legislation's main
drawbacks, which include that it (1) makes application difficult and (2)
encourages inconsistent theories of punishment that undermine long-term
governmental stability. Thus, representative democracy's weaknesses should
preclude it from consideration in Iraq.
"4 Cf. Bill Rankin, Caution Urged in Juvenile Sentencing: Slain Girl's Father Calls for
Stricter Sentences for Violent Georgia Preteens, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 2, 2004 (reporting
on the pressure to allow judges "to impose stricter sentences on preteens convicted of violent
crimes" rather than the current statutory maximum of two years in the wake of a twelve-year-old
being accused of murder), 2004 WL 77160471.
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C. Delegated Authority'
Under a delegated authority model, "an elected, legislature or executive
delegates the power to set punishment rules or to make particular applications
to government actors who have not been elected." '' s The significant structural
"difference between representative democracy and delegated power is the lack
of a direct link between an elected official and a particular rule or decision.
The elected official has no direct responsibility for a particular outcome in a
delegational system."' 6 Appointees who make decisions about sentencing are
subject to nomination and approval by elected officials who are in turn subject
to public approval at the polls for their selection of appointees. Therefore,
delegated authority exerts less democratic control over general sentencing
provisions and particular applications than direct democracy or representative
democracy. Delegated authority exerts slightly more democratic control than
insulated delegation.
Delegated authority is not as common as representative democracy as a
method of determining general sentencing provisions or particular applications
among nations with highly developed economies. Among G-8 nations, only
the U.S. Federal Sentencing Commission determines sentences through
delegated authority." 7 Delegated authority is relatively common within the
United States where many states' executives still appoint judges,' parole
boards, sentencing commissions, and correctional officials." 9
The most controversial example of delegated authority in sentencing is the
United States Sentencing Commission. Congress intended the United States
Sentencing Commission's Sentencing Guidelines "to limit judicial discretion
of courts for downward and upward departures from the guideline
sentences.,,120 "The United States Sentencing Guidelines were created in
11 ZIM NG ET AL., supra note 19, at 184.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 185 (see Table 10.1).
118 See generally American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection in the States, http://www.
ajs.org/js/ (describing the selection process for judges state by state) (last visited Oct. 23,2004).
19 ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 19, at 184; id at 186 (reporting that as of 2001, twenty-three
states still appointed judges rather than electing them and twelve of those states had no periodic
election review ofjudges selected by state representatives).
12o James C. MacGillis, Note, The Dilemma of Disparity: Applying the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines to DownwardDepartures Based on HIVInfection, 81 MINN. L. REv. 229,234 (1996)
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994) (directing the court to follow the sentence range, "unless the
court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree,
not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the
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response to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 ... and apply to all federal
crimes committed after November 1, 1987."2, The U.S. Sentencing Commis-
sion chose "to develop a highly mechanical, 'quasi-elemental' basis for federal
sentencing guidelines. 122 The Commission devised a system of assigning
point values-to elements of each offense with points to be added for specified
aggravating factors and points to be subtracted for specified mitigating
factors.'23 The United States Supreme Court stated in Williams v. New York
that "[t]he belief no longer prevails that every offense in a like legal category
calls for an identical punishment without regard to the past life and habits of
a particular offender."'124 This parallels the legal principle espoused by the
Working Group that "[s]entencing decisions should be made specific to the
individual defendant. 1 25 However, in upholding the constitutionality of the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the limited
consideration of the past life and habits mandated by the Guidelines was
sufficient.
126
One of the primary arguments supporting the contention that the U.S.
Sentencing Commission has failed is that it was not sufficiently insulated from
the political process. 1
27
guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described"); S. REP. No. 98-225,
at 79 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,3262 (noting the rejection of an amendment
that would have expanded the opportunities for judges to depart from the sentencing
guidelines)).
121 Michael A. Simons, Vicarious Snitching: Crime, Cooperation, and "Good Corporate
Citizenship ", 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 979, 979 (2002) (citing Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The
Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 228 (1993)).
'22 Kay A. Knapp & Denis J. Hauptly, State and Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Apples and
Oranges, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 679, 682 (1992) (citing Bruce M. Selya & Matthew R. Kipp,
An Examination of Emerging Departure Jurisprudence Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 3 (1991)).
123 Id. at 685.
' Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,247 (1949). However, the rehabilitationist rhetoric
of this pre-Federal Sentencing Guidelines case may be considered out of date.
125 Road, supra note 39, at 16.
326 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
327 MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 83-89 (1996). State sentencing commissions
have not been immune to political influence, in particular regarding public outcry for greater
severity. Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less
Aggregation, 58 U. Cm. L. REV. 901, 935 (1991).
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Representative Rodino, the Chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee,.. .explained why. . judges rather than presidential
appointees should be given the task of writing sentencing
guidelines: "A presidentially appointed panel can too easily be
dominated by political interests. The temptation to seek public
approval by appearing tough on crime and therefore to propose
standards biased in favor of prosecution and incarceration might
prove too great."'
128
One of the explanations for the overly complex design of the original
Sentencing Guidelines is the means of appointment to the Sentencing
Commission that resulted in the initial set of seven appointees including only
four practitioners, with a relatively small time in practice between them.
29
Finding sentencing commissioners with sufficient experience is not the
problem in Iraq; the problem will be finding commissioners not associated
with the former regime and who do not share the mindset, fostered by that
regime, that judges are political functionaries. 3 ' Some commentators suggest
the Sentencing Commission can be saved by employing "a real administrative
process--one that embraces the ideal of transparency and accountability, one
that routinely lays out its reasoning and gathers or creates evidence to support
its choices."'' Delegated authority without sufficient insulation merely adds
a layer of bureaucracy over a political process rather than effectively creating
a well-respected and expert decision-making body.
The delegated authority model can lead to excessive punishment in two
ways: (1) through integration of mandatory minimum sentencing laws and (2)
by the narrow nature of a guidelines system resulting in higher penalties. First,
integration of mandatory minimum sentences passed by Congress into the
128 Kate Stith & Steven Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 223, 228 (quoting Peter W.
Rodino, Jr., Federal Criminal Sentencing Reform, 11 J. LEGIS. 218, 131 (1984)).
129 See U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Former Commissioners of the United States Sentencing
Commission (listing Judge William W. Wilkins, Jr., Chairman; Judge (later Justice) Stephen G.
Breyer; Judge George E. MacKinnon; Ilene H. Nagel (Professor of Law and Sociology,
University of Indiana Law School); Helen G. Corrothers (Member, U.S. Parole Commission);
Michael K. Block (Professor of Law and Economics, University of Arizona); Paul H. Robinson
(Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School)), http://www.ussc.gov/general/Oldcomms.htm (last
visited Oct. 23, 2004).
130 Craig T. Trebilcock, Notefrom the Field: Legal Cultures Clash in Iraq, ARMY LAW., Nov.
2003, at 48, 48-49.
31 Miller & Wright, supra note 33, at 728-29.
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overall guidelines scheme has inflated punishment for all crimes.' 32 When the
legislature passes a mandatory minimum sentencing law-under a delegated
authority model, the sentencing commission can either read that law as an
exception to the guidelines or rearrange the guidelines for all crimes around
the new law.' This rearrangement increases"the severity of the guideline
sentences generally," such that "the sentences for many crimes not covered by
the mandatory provisions" are also increased.'34 Reading mandatory
sentencing laws as exceptions to the guidelines could resolve this particular
problem. Second, a guidelines system's narrow matrix generally results in
higher sentences. "To the extent that narrow guidelines produce the tendencies
toward excess. . ., their force on the front end of the sentencing process will
tend toward unnecessarily high sentences."' 35
The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines have not protected punishment from
arbitrary application in two respects. First, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
result in arbitrary sentences for the same bad acts relative to state penal codes.
The Guidelines contain common law crimes insofar as they occur on
exclusively federal jurisdictions-like national parks.'36 "Because [such]
offenses... are rare in the federal system and, when prosecuted federally, are
likely to be extreme cases, the guidelines in these areas are essentially
symbolic. As such, setting the penalties at very high levels is of no systemic
significance, despite its significance to the individual statistic, and may even
be inappropriate.""'3 When federal prosecutors make the decision to prosecute
these crimes the punishments are usually more serious than they would be for
the same offense in state court. Therefore, in terms of particular application
the Guidelines have led to both excessive punishment and arbitrary application
based on whether federal prosecutors choose to prosecute or leave the case for
state prosecution.
Second, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines' mechanical approach, like the
Georgia example described above, increases the likelihood of arbitrary
application because they transfer "federal sentencing discretion to the
prosecutor."' 38 "[T]he prosecutor may or may not choose to present evidence
132 TONRY, supra note 127, at 96-98.
133 Id. at 96-97.
134 Id. at 97.
135 ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 19, at 213.
136 Knapp & Hauptly, supra note 122, at 692-93.
'31 Id. at 693 (citations omitted).
138 Id. at 682 (citing 11TH CIRCUrr SENTENCING INST., JUDICIAL SURVEY REPORT (Nov. 1991)
(on file with the U.C. Davis Law Review)).
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to show the presence of aggravating factors... dramatically affect[ing] the
guidelines sentence.'1 39 Before the Guidelines took effect, "the prosecutor's
decision [not to present evidence to show the presence of aggravating factors]
as a trade for a plea simply lowered the maximum available sentence. Under
mechanistic guidelines, conversely, the prosecutor's refusal to present
evidence of weapon use in a crime might dramatically reduce the actual time
served."'40 This sort of built-in fictitious charge in the context of a Iraqi
judiciary recovering from an absence of legitimacy would severely undermine
that recovery.
In terms of feasibility of implementation, "[m]any critics contend that the
federal guidelines are too rigid, too detailed, or too complicated. '14' Knapp
and Hauptly contend that under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines "every
possible element of every possible offense must be considered and either
included or excluded in every sentencing decision. Such an approach starts
with simple elements that achieve enormous complexity very quickly. That
complexity drains the time and energy of every actor in the criminal justice
system."'42 The already capital-starved Iraqi courts cannot sustain a further
drain of court resources.
D. Insulated Delegation
Under an insulated delegation model, sentencing is set by appointees
further distanced from the electorate. Insulated delegation takes the appointees
of the delegated authority model and employs strategies to protect the
appointment process and the appointees from popular influence.
"Strategies... devised to create government actors less subject to democratic
influence than normally appointed officials" include, "long terms in office
(including life tenure forjudges) and staggered terms that do not coincide with
"9 Id. at 686.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 682 (citing FEDERALCOURTS STUDYCOMM.,JUDICIALCONFERENCEOFTHE UNITED
STATES, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMISSION 133-43 (Apr. 2, 1990); Marc
Miller & Daniel J. Freed, The Commission Under Fire: Constructive Advice or Destructive
Attack?, 2 FED. SENTENCING REP. 207-09 (1990)).
142 Knapp & Hauptly, supra note 122, at 686-88 (citing 11TH CIRCUIT SENTENCING INST.,
JUDICIAL SURVEY REPORT, at question 15 (Nov. 1991) (on file with the U.C. Davis Law
Review); FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMISSION at 137 (Apr. 2, 1990)). This complexity
and concomitant inefficiency will inevitably increase in the wake of Blakely. See Blakely, 124
S. Ct. at 2544. But see Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 779.
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the electoral cycles .of the persons who appoint the power holder." 4 3 The
purpose of such insulating tactics is "to reduce the power of 'electoral
majorities to influence punishment rules and outcomes."'" The-public elects
an official who nominates someone who then must be approved. Once
approved the appointee will have a long term in office, possibly life tenure, or
staggered terms that do not coincide with the appointing or approving
officials'. Insulated delegation is the least democratic system of determining
sentences examined by this Note.'45 -
Insulated delegation is a common method of determining particular
sentencing applications, but is relatively rare in terms of general sentencing
provisions. In terms of G-8 nations, Canada, France, Italy, the United
Kingdom, Germany, Japan, and the United States' federal judiciary determine
particular applications through insulated delegation.'46 These nations "use
insulated judicial officers to administer punishments at the retail level, with
judicial discretion quite wide in most systems and rather more narrow in the
U.S. scheme." 47
Under an insulated delegation system, "allocation of responsibility... often
locates individual decisions in institutions effectively removed from represen-
tative democracy, whether in the judicial branch (where conscious insulation
from democratic controls is quite common) or administrative bureaucracies
like parole boards and prison systems (where low-visibility decisions are made
without substantial legislative oversight)."' 45 Among the fifty states of the
United States, eight have sentencing commissions that have issued sentencing
guidelines that "go beyond mere advice to constrain the discretion of
sentencing judges" such that they may be described as establishing general
' ZrMRING ET AL., supra note 19, at 184.
I d. Zimring and his coauthors problematize the concept of insulated delegation by making
it fungible with delegation in many practical respects, but leave it as. a separate-at least
theoretical--construct to further their Federal Reserve System model for the criminal justice
system. Id.
145 See id.
'" Id. at 185 (see Table 10.1) (describing the situation in G-7 nations before Russia joined
to make it the G-8 in 1998); Nikiforov, supra note 101 (describing Russia's criminal justice
system wherejudges alone determine particular applications and are insulated to anextent in that
"[f]irst-time judges are elected for a 5-year period of probation and after that they are elected to
a life term").
'"' ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 19, at 186; see Nikiforov, supra note 10 1.
148 ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 19, at 185.
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provisions via insulated delegation.'49 Twelve U.S. states employ insulated
delegation in the particular application of criminal sentences.'50
Minnesota, the primary model of insulated delegation in shaping general
sentencing provisions, was the first state to create a Sentencing Commission
charged with determining Sentencing Guidelines.' State guidelines systems
like Minnesota's
have three things in common. First, their policies are realistically
grounded in clearly articulated principles regarding both the
purposes and goals of a sentencing system. Second, their
sentencing policies are easily understandable and functional
because they are experientially grounded in the concept of "usual
case" [that takes into account offender characteristics, situational
factors, relationship between victim and offender, victim
characteristics, and nature of the harm]. Finally, these states
developed all policies with a specific eye toward implementa-
tion."
Beyond the legislature's initial determination of the fundamental policies
guiding the Sentencing Commission, these state bodies remain insulated
through long tenures and staggered appointments. The most convincing
argument for insulating sentencing policymaking is that it "avoid[s] placing a
vulnerable area of governance in an arena where it can be used as an opening
wedge for broader attempts to undermine the credibility of government."'5 3
Two factors reduce the likelihood of excessive punishment in insulated
delegation as compared to delegated authority: (1) complete delegation from
the legislature and (2) liberal departure standards forjudges. First, unlike the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which were overrun by mandatory minimum
sentencing legislation, "4 in an insulated delegation model the legislature may
pass laws regarding the overall purpose of criminal punishment' or
"" Id. at 186-87 (see Table 10.2).
10 Id.
"' Richard S. Frase, Implementing Commission-BasedSentencing Guidelines: The Lessons
of the First Ten Years in Minnesota, 2 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 279, 279 (1993).
112 Knapp & Hauptly, supra note 122, at 681.
153 ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 19, at 232.
114 Id. at 213.
s' See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 364.01 (2003) (declaring the general purpose of criminal justice
in Minnesota to be rehabilitation).
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criminalizing particular activities, 15 6 but the legislature completely delegates
all power regarding general sentencing provisions to the commission.' Some
state sentencing commissions have been more successful at remaining
insulated from the political process. 58 Commentators hold up Minnesota's
Sentencing Commission as an example of a well-selected group in part due to
its insularity.159
Second, allowingjudges to depart from guidelines if they provide sufficient
grounds counters narrow guidelines' tendency towards excessive punishment.
Commentators often cite the Minnesota Guideline's departure standard for its
success. 6 This built-in flexibility allows judges to depart from the guidelines
when circumstances not addressed in the guidelines arise. Allowing judges to
depart from the guidelines and complete delegation from the legislature makes
the insulated delegation model the least likely to result in excessive punish-
ments.
Minnesota's insulated delegation model reduces arbitrary application.
Where all of the other models merely shift the power of arbitrary application
of sentences from judges to prosecutors, Minnesota's liberal allowance for
judicial departure checks prosecutors' power by allowing for deviation from
the sentencing guidelines. In addition, the requirement that judges write
grounds for departures creates transparency that allows for substantive
appellate review. Furthermore, judges insulated from the political process
would be less likely to impose a sentence based on public opinion or pressure
from the legislative or executive branches of government.
The insulated delegation model is feasible for application in Iraq. This
model could take advantage of Iraq's experienced legal community by
appointing well-respected experts to the commission. This commission would
make decisions based on consistent theories of punishment. This insulated
expertise and consistency would give the new government legitimacy and long-
term stability. Completely delegating the authority to the commission would
allow the legislative body to focus on the innumerable and urgent tasks the
new government faces. A streamlined guidelines matrix like Minnesota's
116 See. e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.80 (2003) (criminalizing stealing access to cable television).
'57 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 244.09 (2003).
158 ZIMING ET AL., supra note 19, at 213.
' Greg Rogers, Comment, Criminal Sentencing in Colorado: Ripefor Reform, 65 U. CoLO.
L. REv. 685, 695-96 (1994).
"6 Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A Comparison of
Federal andState Experiences, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1441, 1482 (1997); see MINN. STAT. § 244.10
(2003) (allowing judges to deviate from the guidelines).
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would make application simpler than under the other methods. This simplicity
at the sentencing phase would help to conserve the criminal justice system's
resources.
IV. CONCLUSION
Now that the new Iraqi government is in a position to reassess how it
governs its people, one aspect to consider is sentencing procedure. Iraq would
do well to consider the copious scholarship on the U.S. federal and state
models and examine the balance between democracy and criminal sentencing.
California's citizen-drafted criminal sentencing initiative serves as an example
of direct democracy and reveals its primary shortcoming-overreaction to
popular sentiment. In Iraq, the potential for post-emancipation backlash
against former oppressors makes such potential for overreacting to popular
sentiment untenable. Georgia's patchwork legislation serves as an example of
representative democracy and reveals its primary shortcomings--difficult
application and inconsistent theories of punishment that undermine long-term
governmental stability. In the short term, Iraq needs a criminal sentencing
paradigm with a short learning curve to address the backlog of pending
criminal cases. Over time, the representative democracy approach runs
counter to Iraq's need for governmental stability. The U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines serve as the model for delegated authority and reveal their primary
shortcoming-the significant concentration of discretion in the prosecutor.
After a totalitarian regime, the last thing Iraq needs is concentration of power
in any one group. Furthermore, the potential for manipulation of facts in order
to elicit pleas would undermine the legitimacy of a newly reformed Iraqi
judicial system.
While insulated delegation is the least democratic method of establishing
sentencing policy, it best addresses the needs of a post-Saddam Iraq. The
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines serve as the model for insulated delegation.
There are four advantages to this model. First, the system is accountable to the
electorate through appointment by elected officials. Second, this restriction on
judicial discretion is least likely to lead to excessive punishment. Third, this
system allows for judicial departure with an opportunity for appellate review
to check arbitrary application. Finally, by basing the guidelines on the usual
case, the learning curve for judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys would
be relatively short.
In conclusion, in light of the experience of various jurisdictions in the
United States, to further the goals of a post-Saddam Iraq, a sentencing
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commission based on the insulated delegation model, as illustrated by
Minnesota's Sentencing Commission, should set criminal sentencing policy.
A Minnesota-style system would not lead to excessive punishment, would
protect punishment from arbitrary application, and would be feasible to
implement and maintain.
